Indeed, large U.S. commercial banks publicly disclose information regarding their market risk exposures using VaR (see Jorion (2002) and Liu, Ryan, and Tan (2004) ).
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In an influential paper, however, Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) criticize the use of VaR. They show that VaR is not "coherent" in that it fails to possess the subadditivity property (i.e., two assets in combination can have a VaR greater than the sum of their individual VaRs). Furthermore, it has been recognized that VaR does not take into consideration the size of losses beyond VaR (see, e.g., Basak and Shapiro (2001) , Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002) , and Alexander and Baptista (2006) ). Hence, the use of VaR may lead to the selection of portfolios with substantive tail risk. These researchers have recommended replacing VaR with Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) since it is "coherent" and takes into consideration the size of losses beyond VaR. Jorion (2005)). While it cannot be ascertained if the use of ST is a response by regulators to the concerns with VaR, it does raise the question of whether a risk management system based on VaR and ST constraints is an effective alternative to one based on CVaR.
5
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on this question.
In doing so, we compare the effectiveness of risk management systems based on three different sets of constraints: (1) a VaR constraint, (2) ST constraints, and (3) VaR and ST constraints.
6
Specifically, we investigate whether the constraints preclude the selection of all portfolios with substantive efficiency losses relative to the mean-CVaR boundary.
7
If a set of constraints precludes such portfolios from being selected, then a risk management system based on this set of constraints is effective in controlling CVaR. Thus, any given portfolio that meets the constraints, no matter how selected (e.g., using a mean-variance model), will have tail risk that is similar in magnitude to that of the portfolio with the same expected return that minimizes CVaR. However, if the set of constraints allows the selection of portfolios with substantive efficiency losses, then it is not effectively controlling CVaR.
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (2006, p. 157) we focus on these events.
We begin by considering the case when short selling is disallowed.
9
First, we examine the effectiveness of a risk management system solely based on using either VaR or ST constraints to control CVaR. The results from imposing these two types of constraints are quite similar.
We find that when the VaR or ST bounds do not depend on the required expected return, there is no value for the bound such that the constraint precludes all portfolios with substantive efficiency losses from being selected while allowing the selection of portfolios with a wide range of expected returns. We find next that the use of an appropriately chosen bound that depends on the required expected return has two advantages over the use of one that does not: (i) it is more effective in precluding the selection of portfolios with substantive efficiency losses and (ii) it allows the selection of portfolios with a wide range of expected returns.
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Furthermore, with such bounds ST constraints appear to be more effective than 8   T  h  e  r  e  c  o  g  n  i  t  i  o  n  o  f  t  h  e  p  o  s  s  i  b  i  l  i  t  y  o  f  e  c  o  n  o  m  i  c  d  i  s  a  s  t  e  r  s  h  a  s  b  e  e  n  s  h  o  w  n  t  o  b  e  u  s  e  f  u  l  i  n  e  x  p  l  a  i  n  i  n  g  t  h  e  eu  i  t  y  p  r  e  m  i  u  m  p  u  z  z  l  e  o  f  M  e  h  r  a  a  n  d  P  r  e  s  c  o  t  t  (  1  9  8  5  )  ;  s  e  e  R  i  e  t  z  (  1  9  8  8  )  a  n  d  B  a  r  r  o  (  2  0  0  6  )  .   9   T  h  e  i  n  t  e  r  e  s  t  i  n  t  h  i  s  c  a  s  e  i  s  a  p  p  a  r  e  n  t  i  n  t  h  e  r  e  c  e  n  t  l  i  t  e  r  a  t  u  r  e  .  S  e  e  ,  f  o  r  e  x  a  m  p  l  e  ,  J  a  g  a  n  n  a  t  h  a  n  a  n  d  M  a  (  2  0  0 s  c  h  o  s  e  n  s  o  t  h  a  t  i  t  m  i  n  i  m  i  z  e  s  t  h  e  m  a  x  i  m  u  m  e  ffi  c  i  e  n  c  y  l  o  s  s  g  i  v  e  n  t  h  e  r  eu  i  r  e  d  e  x  p  e  c  t  e  d  r  e  t  u  r  n  w  h  i  l  e  a  l  l  o  w  i  n  g  t  h  e  s  e  l  e  c  t  i  o  n  o  f  t  h  e  p  o  r  t  f  o  l  i  o  o  n  t  h  e  m  e  a  n  -C  V  a  R  b  o  u  n  d  a  r  y  w  i  t  h  t  h  i  s  e  x  p  e  c  t  e  d  r  e  t  u  r  n  .  A  V  a  R  (  S  T  )  c  o  n  s  t  r  a  i  n  t  t  h  a  t  u  s  e  s  t  h  i  s  b  o  u  n  d  a  l  l  o  w  s  (  b  u  t  t  y  p  i  c  a  l  l  y  d  o  e  s  n  o  t  f  o  r  c  e  )  t  h  e  s  e  l  e  c  t  i  o  n  o  f  t  h  e  p  o  r  t  f  o  l  i  o  w  i  t  h  a  z  e  r  o  e  ffi  c  i  e  n  c  y  l  o  s  s  w  h  i  l  e  p  r  e  c  l  u  d  i  n  g  (  a  s  m  u  c  h  a  s  p  o  s  s  i  b  l  e  )  t  h  e  s  e  l  e  c  t  i  o  n  o  f  p  o  r  t  f  o  l  i  o  s  w  i  t  h  t  h  e  l  a  r  g  e  s  t  e  ffi  c  i  e  n  c  y  l  o  s  s  e  s  . a VaR constraint in managing tail risk. However, it should be noted that the constraints still allow the selection of portfolios with substantive efficiency losses even when the bound depends on the required expected return.
Second, we examine the effectiveness of a risk management system based on both VaR and ST constraints to control CVaR. The results are similar to those for risk management systems solely based on either a VaR constraint or ST constraints but with an important exception.
A risk management system based on both VaR and ST constraints with appropriately chosen bounds is much more effective than systems solely based on either VaR or ST constraints in that it only allows the selection of portfolios that have relatively small efficiency losses.
Next, we consider the case when short selling is allowed.
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We find that a VaR constraint appears to be more effective than ST constraints in managing tail risk. However, the efficiency losses are notably larger than those when short selling is disallowed for risk management systems based on either a VaR constraint, or ST constraints, or both VaR and ST constraints. While the joint use of VaR and ST constraints is more effective than the sole use of either one, we find that the joint use of both constraints still allows the selection of portfolios with substantive efficiency losses. Thus, our results suggest that the effectiveness of a risk management system based on VaR and ST constraints as an alternative to one based on CVaR depends on the possibility of short selling.
It should be noted that our findings on the ineffectiveness of VaR and ST to jointly control tail risk when short selling is allowed have particular relevance in the context of the trading books of large banks.
2
These banks sometimes have large short positions in their trading books (see, e.g., Jackson, Maude, and Perraudin (1997) (2000) compare portfolios with minimum variance and CVaR given an expected return constraint. Krokhmal, Palmquist, and Uryasev (2002) characterize portfolios with maximum expected return for various CVaR constraints. Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Bertsimas, Lauprete, and Samarov (2004) compare portfolios on the mean-variance and mean-CVaR boundaries.
4
Our work differs from these papers in that we explore the extent to which the joint use of VaR and ST constraints is an effective alternative to the use of CVaR as a measure of risk.
Recent papers explore the portfolio selection implications arising from solely using either
(1) a VaR constraint or (2) ST constraints.
5
Some of these papers use a continuous-time expected utility model. For example, Basak and Shapiro (2001) find that when an agent faces a VaR constraint at the initial date, he or she may select a larger exposure to risky assets than that in its absence. Yiu (2004) show that a dynamic VaR constraint leads an agent to reduce his or her exposure to risky assets. Cuoco and Liu (2006) find that the VaRbased capital requirements of the Basle Capital Accord are effective in curbing portfolio risk.
Other papers use discrete-time models. For example, Baptista (2004, 2006) show selected without the constraint. However, there are also conditions under which doing so leads to the selection of portfolios with smaller standard deviations (see Sentana (2003) and Baptista (2004, 2006) ). Daníelsson and Zigrand (2008) show that VaR-based regulation can lower systemic risk in an equilibrium model. Alexander and Baptista (2008) show that adding ST constraints to the mean-variance model tends to increase the optimal holding of the risk-free asset, thereby decreasing the exposure to risky assets. Our work differs from these papers in that we examine the effectiveness of jointly using VaR and ST constraints in controlling CVaR. is a CVaR constraint with the same effect on the optimal portfolio. Our work differs from these papers in two respects. First, we assume that asset returns have a discrete distribution with finitely many jumps, an assumption that is often used in practice to estimate VaR with simulation. Second, we examine whether a VaR constraint with and without ST is effective in precluding the selection of portfolios with substantive efficiency losses relative to the mean-CVaR boundary.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 examines the effectiveness of risk management systems based on VaR and ST constraints to control CVaR when short selling is disallowed. Section 4 presents the results in the case when short selling is allowed, and Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Suppose that uncertainty is described by S states (s = 1, ..., S). Let p s > 0 denote the probability of state s. There are J risky assets (j = 1, ..., J) and a risk-free asset (j = J + 1).
Asset returns are given by a (J + 1) × S matrix R with R j s denoting the return of asset j in state s.
] with w 1 = 1, where w j represents the weight of asset j. Note that a positive (negative) weight in an asset represents a long (short) position in the asset.
VaR
In defining VaR, we follow Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002, Proposition 8) . Fix a confi- 
where p n ,
Portfolio w's VaR at the 100α% confidence level is given by
Eqs. (1) and (2) imply that
As Eqs. (3) and (4) show, this definition of VaR is based on the upper quantile (see, for example, Acerbi and Tasche (2002) 
CVaR
In defining CVaR, we follow Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002, Proposition 8) . Portfolio w's CVaR at the 100α% confidence level is given by
Using Eqs. (2) and (5), we have:
Loss in an ST event
While in practice there is a wide range of tools used to stress test a portfolio, our paper specifically captures the use of scenario analysis in setting risk exposure limits.
1 7 (2007, p. 357) points out that scenario analysis consists of evaluating a portfolio under various extreme states of the world. In this paper, we focus on the case when the scenarios that are analyzed are based on historical events.
Jorion

8
The Committee on the Global Financial System (2005 , Table 12 ) reports that the two most frequently used historical events in its survey of banks and securities firms are: (a) the crash in the U.S. stock market of 1987 (hereafter, "crash of 87") and (b) the terrorist attacks in the U.S. in September of 2001 (hereafter, "9/11"). Accordingly, we focus on these historical events.
For brevity, we refer to the crash of 87 and 9/11 as ST events 1 and 2, respectively. The 
Eqs. (2) and (6) 
Risk Management when Short Selling is Disallowed
This section explores the effectiveness of risk management systems based on VaR and ST constraints when short selling is disallowed.
VaR constraint
We begin by analyzing the case when only a VaR constraint is imposed. Given a confidence level α, consider the following VaR constraint:
where V is the VaR bound. A VaR constraint can be thought of as being "tightened" when either α increases or V decreases. Of particular interest is the question of whether there exists a VaR constraint that leads to the selection of portfolios with small efficiency losses relative to the mean-CVaR boundary. A portfolio belongs to the mean-CVaR boundary if there is no portfolio with the same expected return and a smaller CVaR. We measure a portfolio's efficiency loss by the difference between:
(i) its CVaR and (ii) the CVaR of the portfolio on the mean-CVaR boundary with the same expected return.
0
Hence, when tail risk is measured by CVaR, a portfolio's efficiency loss represents the increase in tail risk arising from selecting it instead of the portfolio with the same expected return that has minimum tail risk.
Optimization inputs
In examining the effectiveness of various risk management systems, we consider a problem of wealth allocation among the following asset classes: (i) T-bills (assumed to be risk-free),
(ii) government bonds, (iii) corporate bonds, and (iv) six size/book-to-market Fama-French portfolios. As a robustness check, we find that our results are similar if (1) T-bills, or (2) bonds, or (3) T-bills and bonds are removed from consideration.
Since historical simulation is often used in practice to estimate VaR, CVaR, and losses in ST events, historical data is utilized to obtain a plausible distribution for the returns on the asset classes. We obtain monthly returns on T-bills and the Fama-French portfolios from Kenneth French's website.
1
We use the Merrill Lynch government and corporate bond master indices to measure the monthly returns on, respectively, government and corporate bonds. Five facts are worth noting. First, the average returns on the asset classes involving stocks are larger than those involving bonds with a single exception: the average return on the small-size/low-book-to-market-ratio Fama-French portfolio is slightly smaller than that on corporate bonds. Second, the standard deviations of the asset classes involving stocks are much larger than those involving bonds. Third, the VaRs and CVaRs for stocks are much larger than for bonds at each confidence level.
3
Fourth, for any given risky asset class and confidence level, CVaRs are larger than VaRs.
Fifth, for any given risky asset class, higher confidence levels are associated with larger VaRs and CVaRs.
Methodology
The methodology utilized in analyzing the effectiveness of VaR and ST constraints in minimizing tail risk as measured by CVaR is summarized in Figure 1 .
4
Three sets of constraints are considered: (1) a VaR constraint, (2) two ST constraints, and (3) both a VaR and two ST constraints. Initially short selling is disallowed and then short selling is allowed, resulting in six basic cases. For each case the analysis proceeds as follows.
In
Step 1 a confidence level of either 95% or 99% and constraint bounds for the case at hand are chosen. While the minimum expected return E is assumed to be the risk-free rate, the maximum feasible expected return E is determined in Step 2.
Step 3 uses these minimum and maximum expected returns to calculate δ ≡ (E − E)/100. The value of δ is then used in Step 4 to create a grid of 101 expected returns E i that range from E to E in return increments of δ. In
Step 5 the maximum efficiency loss M i is determined for each
is measured by the difference between the CVaRs of: (1) 
, AL, and GL for each one of the six cases.
It should be emphasized that the purpose of examining maximum efficiency losses captures the idea of being agnostic regarding the model that is used to select portfolios in the presence of VaR and/or ST constraints. The motivation for this idea is two-fold. First, we are interested in exploring the effectiveness of these constraints to control CVaR without making any assumption regarding the model that is used to select portfolios. If maximum efficiency losses are relatively small with a given set of constraints, then a risk management system based on this set of constraints is effective in controlling CVaR. Thus, any given portfolio that meets the constraints, no matter how selected (e.g., using a mean-variance model), will have a CVaR that is similar in magnitude to that of the portfolio with the same expected return that minimizes CVaR. However, if maximum efficiency losses are substantive, then the aforementioned set of constraints is not effectively controlling CVaR because it allows the selection of portfolios with relatively large CVaRs.
Second, while the use of VaR and ST constraints by certain banks is apparent, we do not know exactly the models that these banks utilize in selecting their trading books. For example, while the managers of such portfolios may have to meet these constraints, they may also have incentives to take substantive risks in attempting to generate large profits. Indeed, Berkowitz and O'Brien (2002) present evidence that these managers take on a substantial amount of risk. They find that large banks sometimes suffer losses in their trading books that are notably larger than their VaRs (see also footnote 13).
Results
The first two rows of Table 2 (a) report the average and global maximum efficiency losses
for various values of α and V . When α is 95% (99%), V is assumed to be either 2% or 4%
(4% or 8%).
5
Three main results can be seen. First, losses are sizeable for all values of α and V . Second, the losses when α = 95% are smaller than those when α = 99%. Third, for either value of α, the losses are smaller when the smaller value of V is used.
The last row of Table 2 (a) shows that using the smaller value of the VaR bound (and therefore a tighter constraint) precludes the selection of more portfolios with large expected returns. For example, when α = 95% and V = 2% (4%), the maximum feasible expected return is 1.10% (1.38%) while that in its absence is 1.58%.
6
Hence, when the bound does not depend on the required expected return, there exists no value for the bound such that a VaR constraint precludes the selection of all portfolios with substantive efficiency losses while allowing the selection of portfolios with large expected returns. Accordingly, we examine next the case when the bound depends on the required expected return.
Let w α , E denote the portfolio on the mean-CVaR boundary at the 100α% confidence level with an expected return of E and non-negative asset weights. Consider the bound
Observe that the bound for a given expected return is equal to the VaR of the minimum The first two rows of (2006)). As the last row of Table 2 (b) shows, the use of a VaR constraint with a bound that depends on the required expected return allows the selection of the portfolio with the largest feasible expected return when the constraint is not imposed (i.e., 1.58%).
The first column of Fig. 2 provides a box plot of the maximum efficiency losses.
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The three horizontal lines in the box represent the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile of the losses. In panels (a) and (b), the values of Similarly, panel (b) indicates that when α is 99%, the loss is less (greater) than roughly 0.6% (2%) for also one-fourth of such values.
ST constraints
We now analyze the case when the following ST constraints are imposed:
where T 1 and T 2 denote the ST bounds associated with, respectively, ST events 1 and 2 (i.e., the crash of 87 and 9/11, respectively). An ST constraint can be thought of as being "tightened" when its ST bound decreases. Of particular interest is the question of whether there exist ST constraints that lead to the selection of portfolios with relatively small efficiency losses.
Optimization inputs
As in Section 3.1, we consider a problem of wealth allocation among the asset classes in 
Results
The first two rows of Table 2 (a) where VaR constraints were imposed.
The last row of Table 3 (a) shows that using smaller values of the ST bounds (and therefore tighter constraints) precludes the selection of more portfolios with large expected returns.
For example, when T 1 = T 2 = 4% (8%), the maximum feasible expected return is 1.01%
(1.21%) while that in their absence is 1.58%. Hence, when the bounds do not depend on the required expected return, there exists no value for the bounds such that the constraints preclude the selection of all portfolios with substantive efficiency losses while allowing the selection of portfolios with large expected returns. Accordingly, we examine next the case where the bounds depend on the required expected return.
Observe that the bound associated to an ST event for a given expected return is equal to the loss of the minimum CVaR portfolio with that expected return in the event. ST constraints with bounds T * 1 , α , E and T * 2 , α , E : (i) allow (but typically do not force) the selection of portfolio
, which has (by construction) an expected return of E and a zero efficiency loss; and
(ii) preclude (as much as possible) the portfolios with an expected return of E that have the largest efficiency losses.
The first two rows of Table 2 (b) where a VaR constraint with a bound depending on the required expected return is used. As the last row of Table   3 (b) shows, the use of ST constraints with bounds that depend on the required expected return allows the selection of the portfolio with the largest feasible expected return when the constraints are not imposed (i.e., 1.58%).
The second column of Fig. 2 provides a box plot of the maximum efficiency losses. The losses differ from those when a VaR constraint is imposed in three main respects (compare the first two columns of this figure) . First, the highest value of the loss with ST constraints is close to (smaller than) the upper quartile with the VaR constraint when α is 95% (99%).
Second, the upper quartile with the former constraints is close to (smaller than) the median with the latter when α is 95% (99%). Third, the median with ST constraints is either relatively close to zero or zero, while that with the VaR constraint is not close to zero.
To assess the statistical significance of the difference between the distributions of losses with VaR and ST constraints, we utilize: (i) the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and
(ii) the Wilcoxon rank sum test. Specifically, using (i), we test the null hypothesis that the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of losses when a VaR constraint is used coincides with that when ST constraints are used against the alternative hypothesis that the former is smaller than the latter.
2
Similarly, using (ii), we test the null hypothesis that the median of the distribution of losses when a VaR constraint is used coincides with that when ST constraints are used against the alternative hypothesis that the former is larger than the latter. The first row in each panel of Table 4 indicates that both null hypotheses are rejected at the 1% level and thus the difference between the distributions is statistically significant.
3
Hence, ST constraints appear to be more effective than a VaR constraint in managing tail risk when short selling is disallowed.
VaR and ST constraints
Consider the VaR and ST constraints given by Eqs. (7), (9), and (10). Of particular interest is the question of whether there exist VaR and ST constraints that, when jointly used, lead to the selection of portfolios with relatively small efficiency losses.
Optimization inputs
As in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we consider a problem of wealth allocation among the asset classes in Table 1 .
Results
The first two rows of Table 5 The last row of 
Risk Management when Short Selling is Allowed
Next, we examine the case when short selling is allowed. In doing so, the weight of each asset class is restricted to be between −50% and 150% since this is realistic and consistent with practice as indicated by Jacobs and Levy (2007) .
5
For brevity, we refer to it simply as the case when short selling is allowed.
6
Note that financial leverage (i.e., borrowing) is now permitted as it corresponds to short selling the risk-free asset.
VaR constraint
Suppose that a VaR constraint is imposed. We begin by examining the case when the VaR bound does not depend on the required expected return. The first two rows of Tables 6(a) and 2(a)), but quantitatively, two differences are worth noting. First, the losses with short selling is more than 70% larger than those when it is disallowed. Second, the maximum feasible expected return with short selling is roughly 50% larger than that when it is disallowed.
Next, we examine the case when the bound depends on the required expected return.
Let w α , E denote the portfolio on the mean-CVaR boundary at the 100α% confidence level with an expected return of E and asset weights between −50% and 150%. Let , which has (by construction) an expected return of E and a zero efficiency loss; and (ii) precludes (as much as possible) portfolios with an expected return of E that have the largest efficiency losses. Tables 6(b) and 2(b)), but quantitatively, two differences are worth noting. First, the losses when short selling is allowed are roughly three times or more the size of those when it is disallowed (see the first two rows of Tables 6(b) and 2(b)). Second, the maximum feasible expected return when short selling is allowed is roughly 30% larger than that when it is disallowed (see the last row of Tables 6(b) and 2(b)).
The first column of Fig. 3 provides a box plot of the maximum efficiency losses. Note that the upper quartile, median, and lower quartile with short selling are noticeably larger than these quartiles with it is disallowed (compare the first column of Figs. 2 and 3 ; note that different scales are used in the figures). The intuition for why the former quartiles are larger than the latter is straightforward. Observe that the set of portfolios that satisfy expected return and VaR constraints with short selling is larger than that when it is disallowed. Thus, for any level of required expected return that is feasible, the loss with short selling is (by construction) equal to or larger than that when it is disallowed.
Next, we assess the statistical significance of the difference between the distributions of losses when short selling is disallowed and when it is allowed by utilizing: (i) the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and (ii) the Wilcoxon rank sum test.
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Specifically, using (i), we test the null hypothesis that the cdf of losses when short selling is disallowed coincides with that when it is allowed against the alternative hypothesis that the former is larger than the latter. Similarly, using (ii), we test the null hypothesis that the median of the distribution of losses when short selling is disallowed coincides with that when it is allowed against the alternative hypothesis that the former is smaller than the latter. The first row of the two panels of Table 7 indicates that both null hypotheses are rejected at the 1% level and thus the difference between the distributions is statistically significant. Hence, with a VaR constraint efficiency losses are significantly larger when short selling is allowed than when it is disallowed.
ST constraints
Suppose that ST constraints are imposed. We begin by examining the case when the ST bounds do not depend on the required expected return. The first two rows of Table 8(a) report the average and global maximum efficiency losses for various values of α, T (compare Tables 8(a) and 3(a) ), but quantitatively, two differences are worth noting. First, the losses when short selling is allowed are roughly two times or more the size of those when it is disallowed (see the first two rows of Tables 8(a) and 3(a)). Second, the maximum feasible expected return when short selling is allowed is roughly 75% larger than that when it is disallowed (see the last row of Tables 8(a) and 3(a)).
Next, we examine the case when the ST bounds depend on the required expected return.
).
ST constraints with bounds T * 1 , α , E
and T * 2 , α , E
: (i) allow (but typically do not force) the selection of portfolio w
, which has (by construction) an expected return of E and a zero efficiency loss; and (ii) preclude (as much as possible) the portfolios with an expected return of E that have the largest efficiency losses. In addition, the upper quartile, median, and lower quartile with short selling are noticeably larger than those when it is disallowed (compare the second column of Figs. 2 and 3 ).
The intuition for why the former quartiles are larger is similar to that presented for the case of a VaR constraint. Observe that the set of portfolios that satisfy expected return and ST constraints with short selling is larger than that when it is disallowed. Thus, for any level of required expected return that is feasible, the loss with short selling is (by construction) equal to or larger than that when it is disallowed.
We now assess the statistical significance of the difference between the distributions of losses with VaR and ST constraints by utilizing: (i) the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and (ii) the Wilcoxon rank sum test. Specifically, using (i), we test the null hypothesis that the cdf of losses when a VaR constraint is used coincides with that when ST constraints are used against the alternative hypothesis that the former is larger than the latter. Similarly, using (ii), we test the null hypothesis that the median of the distribution of losses when a VaR constraint is used coincides with that when ST constraints are used against the alternative hypothesis that the former is smaller than the latter. The second row of each panel of Table   4 indicates that both null hypotheses are rejected at the 1% level and thus the difference between the distributions is statistically significant. Hence, in contrast to when short selling is disallowed, a VaR constraint appears to be more effective in managing tail risk when it is allowed.
Next, we assess the statistical significance of the difference between the distributions of losses with ST constraints when short selling is disallowed and when it is allowed. Specifically, using (i), we test the null hypothesis that the cdf of losses when short selling is disallowed coincides with that when it is allowed against the alternative hypothesis that the former is larger than the latter. Similarly, using (ii), we test the null hypothesis that the median of the distribution of losses when short selling is disallowed coincides with that when it is allowed against the alternative hypothesis that the former is smaller than the latter. The second row of the two panels of Table 7 indicates that both null hypotheses are rejected at the 1% level and thus the difference between the distributions is statistically significant. Hence, efficiency losses with ST constraints are significantly larger when short selling is allowed than when it is disallowed.
VaR and ST constraints
Suppose that VaR and ST constraints are both imposed. We begin by examining the case when the VaR and ST bounds do not depend on the required expected return. The first two rows of Table 9 (a) report average and global maximum efficiency losses for various values of α, V , T 1 , and T
2
. The results are qualitatively similar to those when short selling is disallowed (compare Tables 9(a) and 5(a)), but quantitatively, two differences are worth noting. First, the losses when short selling is allowed are at least 50% larger than those when it is disallowed (see the first two rows of Tables 9(a) and 5(a)). Second, the maximum feasible expected return when short selling is allowed is also at least 50% larger than that when it is disallowed (see the last row of Tables 9(a) and 5(a)). , which has (by construction) an expected return of E and a zero efficiency loss; and (ii) preclude (as much as possible) the portfolios with an expected return of E that have the largest efficiency losses. The first two rows of Table 9 (b) report the average and global maximum efficiency losses when these constraints are used and α is either 95% or 99%. The results are qualitatively similar to those when short selling is disallowed, but quantitatively, three differences are worth noting.
First, the losses when short selling is allowed are at least four times the size of those when it is disallowed (see the first two rows of Tables 9(b) and 5(b)). Second, the maximum feasible expected return when short selling is allowed is roughly 30% larger than that when it is disallowed (see the last row of Tables ST constraints with short selling is larger than that when it is disallowed. Thus, for any level of required expected return that is feasible, the loss with short selling is (by construction) equal to or larger than that when it is disallowed.
Next, we assess the statistical significance of the difference between the distributions of losses with both VaR and ST constraints when short selling is disallowed and it is allowed.
Specifically, using (i), we test the null hypothesis that the cdf of losses when short selling is disallowed coincides with that when it is allowed against the alternative hypothesis that the former is larger than the latter. Similarly, using (ii), we test the null hypothesis that the median of the distribution of losses when short selling is disallowed coincides with that when it is allowed against the alternative hypothesis that the former is smaller than the latter.
The third row of the two panels of Table 7 indicates that both null hypotheses are rejected at the 1% level and thus the difference between the distributions is statistically significant.
Hence, efficiency losses with both VaR and ST constraints are significantly larger when short selling is allowed than when it is disallowed.
Conclusion
In seeking to promote the soundness of banking systems, regulators have emphasized the importance of risk management. For example, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision ST constraints in isolation as alternatives to one that seeks to minimize CVaR for a given expected return. We find that ST constraints are more effective in controlling tail risk when short selling is disallowed, but that a VaR constraint is more effective when it is allowed.
However, in both cases, efficiency losses are still substantive. Hence, we proceed to examine the joint use of VaR and ST constraints.
We find that when short selling is disallowed and appropriate bounds are utilized, portfolios with relatively small CVaRs are selected. However, when short selling is allowed, the joint use of the constraints, while beneficial in reducing efficiency losses (relative to the case when only one kind of constraint is used), still allows the selection of portfolios with relatively large CVaRs. These results suggest that the severity of the aforementioned conflict depends on the allowance of short selling.
It should be noted that our findings on the ineffectiveness of VaR and ST to control tail risk when short selling is allowed are particularly relevant in the context of the trading books of large banks. These banks sometimes have large short positions in their trading books.
Indeed, notable losses suffered by banks in their trading books are sometimes attributed to these positions. Accordingly, regulators should recognize that the joint use of VaR and ST is unreliable in controlling tail risk within the trading books of such banks. 1987 (October 19, 1987 and (ii) the terrorist attacks in the U.S. in September 2001 (September 11-21, 2001 ). For simplicity, we assume that the return on the risk-free security in an ST event is equal to the product of: (i) the duration of the event expressed as a fraction of a month times (ii) the average risk-free return. All numbers are reported in percentage points. 34 -0.55 -13.03 -11.12 -10.97 -17.94 -18.60 -17.92 9/11 0.16 0.69 -0.60 -15.06 -13.14 -15.34 -11.72 -11.36 -11.72 (a) , the constraints use, respectively, bounds V , T 1 , and T 2 , where V is either 2% or 4% (4% or 8%) when α is 95% (99%), and T 1 = T 2 = 4% or 8%. In panel (b), the constraints use, respectively, bounds V * α,E , T * 1,α,E , and T * 2,α,E as defined by Eqs. (8) and (11), which depend on required expected return E. In both panels, the losses are computed at the confidence level α that is used by the VaR constraint. Furthermore, losses and expected returns are reported in percentage points per month.
(a) bounds V , T 1 , and This table presents results on the statistical significance of differences between the distributions of efficiency losses and of differences between their medians with short selling disallowed and allowed using, respectively, the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon rank sum tests. In both panels, the tests are based on efficiency losses with bounds that depend on the required expected returns. For example, the first row of panel (a) provides the test statistic corresponding to the null hypothesis (H 0 ) that the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of losses when a VaR constraint is imposed and short selling is disallowed coincides with that when the constraint is imposed and short selling is allowed. The alternative hypothesis (H A ) is that the former cdf is smaller than the latter (denoted by cdf(VaR, short selling disallowed) < cdf(VaR, short selling allowed)). Similarly the first row of panel (b) provides the test statistic corresponding to the null hypothesis (H 0 ) that the median of losses when a VaR constraint is imposed and short selling is disallowed coincides with that when the constraint is imposed and short selling is allowed. The alternative hypothesis (H A ) is that the former median is larger than the latter (denoted by median(VaR, short selling disallowed) > median(VaR, short selling allowed)). The confidence level α used to compute VaR and CVaR is either 95% or 99%. "*" indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level. This table reports the average and global maximum efficiency losses and maximum feasible expected returns with (i) ST constraints that use the crash of 87 and 9/11 as the ST events, and (ii) asset weights between −50% and 150%. In panel (a), the constraints use, respectively, bounds T 1 and T 2 , where T 1 = T 2 = 4% or 8%. In panel (b), the constraints use, respectively, bounds T * 1,α,E and T * 2,α,E as defined by Eq. (13), which depend on required expected return E. In both panels, the losses are computed at the confidence level α, where α is either 95% or 99%. Furthermore, losses and expected returns are reported in percentage points per month.
(a) bounds T 1 and T 2 α 95% 99% This table reports the average and global maximum efficiency losses and maximum feasible expected returns with (i) a VaR constraint that uses confidence level α, where α is either 95% or 99%, (ii) ST constraints that use the crash of 87 and 9/11 as the ST events, and (iii) asset weights between −50% and 150%. In panel (a), the constraints use, respectively, bounds V , T 1 , and T 2 , where V is either 2% or 4% (4% or 8%) when α is 95% (99%), and T 1 = T 2 = 4% or 8%. In panel (b), the constraints use, respectively, bounds V * α,E , T * 1,α,E , and T * 2,α,E as defined by Eqs. (12) and (13), which depend on required expected return E. In both panels, the losses are computed at the confidence level α that is used by the VaR constraint. Furthermore, losses and expected returns are reported in percentage points per month.
(a) bounds V , T 1 , and This figure shows a box plot of maximum efficiency losses in the range of feasible expected returns with various constraints when short selling is disallowed. In the first column, we solely impose a VaR constraint that uses confidence level α and bound V * α,E , which depends on the required expected return E as Eq. (10) shows. In the second column, we solely impose ST constraints that use the crash of 87 and 9/11 as the ST events and bounds T * 1,α,E and T * 2,α,E , which depend on required expected return E as Eq. (11) shows. In the third column, we jointly impose the aforementioned VaR and ST constraints. The three horizontal lines in the box represent the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile of the losses. The dashed vertical lines extending from each end of the box show the range of losses. Hence, the horizontal line at the bottom (top) of the lower (upper) dashed vertical line represents the lowest (highest) value for the loss. In the second and third columns, the lower vertical and horizontal lines are not present because the lowest value of the loss equals either: the lower quartile (in panel (a)) or the median (in panel (b)). In panels (a) and (b), the values of α are 95% and 99%, respectively. This figure shows a box plot of maximum efficiency losses in the range of feasible expected returns with various constraints when short selling is allowed. In the first column, we solely impose a VaR constraint that uses confidence level α and bound V * α,E , which depends on the required expected return E as Eq. (12) shows. In the second column, we solely impose ST constraints that use the crash of 87 and 9/11 as the ST events, and bounds T * 1,α,E and T * 2,α,E , which depend on required expected return E as Eq. (13) shows. In the third column, we jointly impose the aforementioned VaR and ST constraints. The three horizontal lines in the box represent the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile of the losses. The dashed vertical lines extending from each end of the box show the range of losses. Hence, the horizontal line at the bottom (top) of the lower (upper) dashed vertical line represents the lowest (highest) loss. In panels (a) and (b), the values of α are 95% and 99%, respectively. 
